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In the generation after World War 11 (1945-69), homosexual
intimacy was a serious crime in Colorado and other states, as was any
kind of "lewdness" or homosexual solicitation; people suspected of
being homosexual were routinely dismissed from federal, state, and
private employment.' In the generation after Stonewall (1969-97),
Colorado's legislature repealed the state's consensual sodomy law,
and the governor by executive order prohibited state employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The cities of Aspen,
Boulder, and Denver enacted ordinances prohibiting private sexual
orientation discrimination in housing, employment, education, public
accommodations, and health and welfare services.2  In 1992, the
voters of Colorado adopted the following amendment to the state
constitution:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts,
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or re-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the
Closet chs. 1.3 (forthcoming 1998).




lationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, pro-
tected status or claim of discrimination.
3
The United States Supreme Court struck down Amendment 2 in
Romer v. Evans4 based on its conflict with the Equal Protection
Clause.5 Writing for himself and two other justices, Justice Scalia
dissented, starting with the premise that "[t]he Court has mistaken a
Kulturkampf for a fit of spite,"6 and arguing at length that the Court's
opinion was inconsistent with both precedent and the ordinary opera-
tion of the democratic process.
Justice Scalia was using the term "Kulturkampf' out of
context. Kulturkampf, a German word for "culture war" or "struggle,"
was a nineteenth century campaign by Bismarck's German Empire to
domesticate the Roman Catholic Church in public culture. 7 The most
noted national Kulturkampf in the United States was the nineteenth
century campaign by the federal government to force conformity on
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints ("LDS Church"),
a campaign that included statutes criminalizing cohabitation outside
of marriage, depriving cohabiting or polygamous Mormons of the
rights to vote and to serve on juries, stripping the same rights from
anyone advocating polygamy, and confiscating the property of the
LDS.8 The Supreme Court upheld the anti-Mormon Kulturkampf in
most respects. The anti-Mormon decision Davis v. Beason9 was one of
two precedents invoked by Justice Scalia to support the
constitutionality of Amendment 2.10 The other precedent cited was
Bowers v. Hardwick.11
Justice Scalia's charge was that Romer is inconsistent with
both the rule of law and the system of democracy. In this Comment, I
join Professor Schacter and other scholars in responding to Justice
Scalia's charge. 12 Romer subserves, rather than undermines, the rule
3. 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
4. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996).
5. Id. at 1629. See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 45
(1996).
6. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology,
Politics, 1870-1914 at 19-20 (Princeton U., 1995).
8. Richard S. Van Wagoner, Mormon Polygamy: A History 115-22 (Signature Books, 2d
ed., 1989).
9. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
10. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
12. See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness,
95 Mich. L. Rev. 203 (1996); Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 Const.
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of law in America's representative democracy. I make three kinds of
arguments. The first argument challenges Justice Scalia's invocation
of "majority-rules" democracy as the basis for legitimate state deci-
sionmaking. According to the Framers' design, which guaranteed
"republican" governance at both the state and federal levels, majori-
tarianism is not the litmus test for government legitimacy. Indeed,
the Framers expected law to be shaped by courts as well as by popular
majorities. The second argument combines gaylegal history with a
theory of courts: A key role for the judiciary is to resist Kulturkampf,
and to help the political system repudiate the legacy of Kulturkampf.
A third argument is representation-reinforcing:13 By invalidating
local rules protecting openly gay people against job discrimination,
the Colorado initiative impaired the ability of lesbian, gay, and
bisexual citizens to exercise their political rights. Conversely, by
resisting those antidiscrimination rules, the Court was in a small way
helping to restore conditions needed for the effective operation of a
majority-rules democratic process.
I. DIRECT VERSUS REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
As Justice Scalia posed the case, the Court's opinion protecting
lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men was a judicial intrusion into an area
left by the Constitution to "normal democratic means, including the
democratic adoption of provisions in state constitutions."14 Later he
contrasted Amendment 2's adoption by "this most democratic of pro-
cedures" (that is, a voter initiative), with what he disrespected as the
Court's unprecedented and elitist opinion. 5 The Court declined to
respond, but there is an obvious response from the text and original
intent of the Constitution's Framers.
The Constitution's text and original design offer scant support
for Justice Scalia's strong invocation of a "countermajoritarian diffi-
Commentary 257 (1996); Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 Vand.
L. Rev. 361 (1997); Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of
Warren Court Activism, 1996 S. Ct. Rev. 67.
13. See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(Harvard U., 1980).
14. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. Compare with id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing a voter initiative as
"most democratic"); id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reflecting that law school elitism is at
odds with "more plebeian attitudes" prevailing in legislatures and among the people).
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culty."16 To begin with, democratic initiatives and referenda such as
Colorado's Amendment 2 are exceptional in our constitutional scheme:
the federal government is a representative and not a direct democ-
racy, 17 and Article IV guarantees the states a republican and not a
democratic form of government. This design was carefully considered
by the Framers and most famously defended in Madison's Federalist
No. 10. That paper rejected direct democracy as a basis for lawmak-
ing, because it gave freer rein to "factions," which Madison defined as
citizens "united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community."1S Madison worried that a
factionalized polity "divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to
vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common
good."19
Madison was pessimistic that the nation could avoid the prob-
lem by eliminating the causes of factions; the best a nation can do is
to ameliorate their effects. This was the reason he favored a republic
over a pure democracy: the latter gave factionalism free rein when
passion and interest ruled a majority of the people, whereas the for-
mer provided a check on temporary passion or interest through the
filter of the elected representatives. "Under such a regulation it may
well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives
of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pro-
nounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose."20 On
the other hand, Madison conceded that corrupt or sinister representa-
tives could themselves betray the public good and establish factional
policy.21 There were three checks against this latter possibility, two
emphasized by Madison and one by Hamilton.
In Federalist No. 10, Madison argued that the large size of the
American republic provided a check against local factions. It is less
16. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics (Bobbs-MerriUl Co., 1962); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political
Seduction of the Law (Free Press, 1990).
17. The original Constitution required the President and Senate to be indirectly elected,
with only the House elected directly by the people. The Senate is now directly elected by reason
of the Seventeenth Amendment, and the President by practice, but Madison's core idea-that
the federal government would be a republic and not a democracy-remains intact after 200
years.
18. Federalist No. 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 77, 78
(Mentor, 1961).
19. Id. at 79.




likely that a parochial interest would be able to command national
support at nearly the same level as at the local level, and America's
diversity makes it unlikely that local passions will inflame the entire
country. In Federalist No. 51, he argued that federalism (two-level
government) and separation of powers at the national level protected
against factional excesses and official corruption, so that the "private
interest of every individual [officeholder] may be a sentinel over the
public rights.."22 In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton argued that interpre-
tation and review of laws by an independent judiciary would protect
the polity against "unjust and partial laws. 23 As Hamilton put it,
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors
which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures,
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have
a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
24
In short, representative democracy was intended to be countermajor-
itarian, at least much of the time. Hence, Justice Scalia has no argu-
ment-as a matter of our constitutional tradition-that judges must
presumptively go along with majority-based limits on minority rights.
Judicial review was intended to be countermajoritarian and even
elitist, if the Framers' intent and design are credited.
The foregoing points were made primarily to defend the
Constitution's structuring of the national government as a represen-
tative republic. States like Colorado have properly adopted a differ-
ent form of government which combines features of representative
and direct democracy. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of state gov-
ernments and their frequent sacrifice of the purely representative
form do not rescue Justice Scalia's invocation of the
countermajoritarian difficulty. The main reason is that state judges
are bound by the supremacy clause of Article VI to enforce the
guarantees of national statutes, treaties, and the Constitution against
the desires of statewide popular or legislative majorities. Whatever
form of government Colorado has chosen cannot trump the republican
22. Federalist No. 51 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 320, 322
(Mentor, 1961).
23. Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 464, 470
(Mentor, 1961). The quotation in text is from Hamilton's brief discussion of statutory interpre-
tation, but its precept is also applicable to the related discussion of judicial review.
24. Id. at 469.
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philosophy articulated in Federalist Nos. 10 and 78 and enforced by
the Supremacy Clause.
Indeed, Article IV says that the states, too, are supposed to
enjoy a "Republican Form of Government."25 Professor Philip Frickey
argues that the this clause supports a rule of interpreting popular
initiatives and referenda narrowly, especially when they raise consti-
tutional concerns. 26 I agree with the underlying idea that underen-
forced constitutional norms such as those in Article IV be given some
effect through principles or canons of statutory interpretation, 27 al-
though I am unsure whether popular lawmaking is "nonrepublican" in
the sense deployed in Article IV. For example, Madison in Federalist
No. 43 defended the clause to protect against "aristocratic or monar-
chical innovations,"28 and did not mention the direct democracy he
criticized in Federalist No. 10. Popular lawmaking is often inconsis-
tent with an understanding of republicanism as deliberative lawmak-
ing, however, and Frickey's principle might be defended as a theory of
"due process of lawmaking." When popular majorities have thought-
lessly picked on unpopular minorities in ill-conceived and broadly
drafted initiatives serving no discernible public-regarding goal, a
reviewing court ought to construe the initiative narrowly. If the nar-
rowing construction still leaves a gap between the public-regarding
goal and the ambit of the statute, a court should at least sometimes
strike it down, as Judge Hans Linde has argued.29
This is what the courts did to Colorado Amendment 2. The
Colorado Supreme Court properly gave it a narrow construction to
25. U.S. Const., Art. IV.
26. Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct
Democracy (forthcoming 1997). Frickey argues that the Republican Form of Government
Clause is "underenforced" for institutionalist reasons (standing, political question, federalism).
See also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1263-64 (1978). Like other underenforced
constitutional norms, the republican form of government norm can still be given force through
principles of statutory interpretation, such as Frickey's proposed rule that initiatives be
narrowly interpreted, especially to avoid constitutional problems.
27. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992).
28. Federalist No. 43 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 271, 274
(Mentor, 1961) (concluding that a republican form of government should have the authority to
protect against "aristocratic or monarchical innovations").
29. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government"- The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 Or. L. Rev. 19 (1993). I do not address the general
question whether direct democracy measures should generally be subject to heightened scrutiny.
Compare Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L. J. 1503 (1990), with
Lynn A- Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 Chi-Kent
L. Rev. 707 (1991).
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avoid the most obvious abuses of the broadly phrased amendment. 0
For example, under the state court's interpretation, a state agency
charged with protecting against race discrimination could not deny
relief to an African American claimant simply because she was a les-
bian, so long as her claim was based on her race and not her sexual
orientation. Even thus narrowed, the high courts of Colorado and the
United States found Amendment 2 unconstitutional, again properly.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Supreme Court found the amend-
ment's legitimate goal, conservation of state enforcement resources,
too far afield from its broad prohibition.31 He inferred from this lack
of fit that the amendment was precisely the "fit of spite" (to use
Justice Scalia's phrase) that the Constitution's Framers feared from
direct democracy.
An example Justice Kennedy does not mention reinforces his
point.32 The Aspen antidiscrimination law protected heterosexuals as
well as homosexuals against sexual orientation discrimination in the
workplace and with regard to public accommodations. Hence, a gay
bookstore would be just as disabled from refusing to hire a straight
employee as another bookstore would be from refusing to hire a gay
employee. Under Amendment 2, as narrowed by the state court, the
gay bookstore is still prohibited from discriminating against the
straight applicant, but the straight bookstore is free to discriminate
against the gay applicant. The amendment did not eliminate sexual
orientation as an enforcement category. By carving gays and lesbians
out from its protection, the amendment revealed an interest not in
conserving enforcement resources, but in gay-bashing alone.33
30. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo. 1994), discussed in Romer, 116 S. Ct.
at 1626-27; id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. The state also asserted as a goal protecting people from having to associate with
homosexuals. Justice Kennedy treated this as a legitimate state goal, Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1627-29, but such a freedom of association has not been recognized as an exclusionary right
where it is engaged in by a public accommodation (which under the common law was required to
serve anyone) or a business operating in the larger marketplace. Recall, too, that freedom of
association is typically the right invoked to support apartheid, or legal segregation of one group
of citizens from another.
32. The following point was made (rather elliptically) in Brief of the American Bar
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
(available on LEXIS, in Genfed Library, USPlus file), and also in Amar, 95 Mich. L. Rev. at 207-
08 (cited in note 12).
33. Likewise, the freedom-of-association goal was imperfectly realized by the initiative. It
allowed homophobes to avoid gay people, even though there is no demonstrated "harm" that gay
people impose on straight people (beyond triggering the homophobe's irrational fears). It did
not, however, allow straight-fearing gay people to avoid straight people, even though straight
people frequently assault, taunt, and threaten gay people.
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II. JuDiciAL REVIEW AS A PROTECTION AGAINST KULTURKAMPF
To establish his argument that the rule of law required the
Court to uphold Amendment 2, Justice Scalia relied on two prece-
dents of the Court: Davis v. Beason and Bowers v. Hardwick. The
first has been thoroughly overruled by the Supreme Court.34 Its
complete rejection reflects a principle at the heart of judicial review's
protection against Hamilton's "unjust and partial laws": The inde-
pendent judiciary should be the guardian against Kulturkampf, the
phenomenon Justice Scalia, probably mistakenly, invoked in his dis-
sent. To the extent that history's rejection of Beason reflects a robust
principle that Kulturkampf is constitutionally questionable, Bowers v.
Hardwick-the most uniformly criticized Supreme Court decision in
my lifetime-should be overruled as well. Beason and Bowers are
invalid precedents pursuant to the same constitutional meta-princi-
ple, that the judiciary should resist state Kulturkampf. The rule-of-
law invalidity of those precedents provides constitutional doctrinal
support for the Court's disposition in Romer.
A. Beason and Anti-Mormon Kulturkampf
In Beason, the Supreme Court acquiesced in a Kulturkampf.
Justice Scalia claimed that the precedent remains good law, except for
its willingness to uphold criminal prosecution for mere advocacy of
polygamy. 35 Contrary to his position, however, Beason is a precedent
as thoroughly repudiated and normatively unsustainable as just
about any the Court has ever delivered. Consider the context of that
decision.
After the 1840s, the LDS Church advocated, and many of its
members practiced, "plural marriage" (polygamy) as a matter of
religious faith. The Mormons were persecuted for this and other
reasons in the several places where they originally settled, so they
resettled in the barren terrain around the Great Salt Lake in what is
now Utah. Their practice of plural marriage was prohibited as
bigamy by federal law, and the Supreme Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provided no defense to
criminal prosecutions in Reynolds v. United States.36
Emboldened by Reynolds, the enemies of the Mormons
launched a broader campaign to destroy the Latter Day Saints, so
34. Patrick v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984).
35. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635-36 & n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
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long as they adhered to polygamy. 37 Presidents Hayes, Garfield, and
Arthur all made it their business to lead a federal war against
Mormon polygamists. Their ally in Congress, Senator George
Edmunds, Republican of Vermont, procured legislation making
"unlawful cohabitation" (easier to prove than polygamy) a federal
crime, depriving polygamists of the right to vote and to serve on juries
or in public office, and offering amnesty to polygamists who renounced
their religious practice.38 Apostle John Henry Smith witnessed the
House vote for Edmunds's bill in 1883 and had this to say: "The
Republicans were filled with venom and were bent upon the ac-
complishment [sic] of their purpose.... God our Father must judge
these men for their evil design and [I] doubt not he will do so in his
own due time."
39
The Republicans' venom was unleashed in a campaign of vio-
lent persecution. More than 1000 Mormon polygamists, or "cohabs,"
were hunted down by federal marshals who specialized in their cap-
ture, convicted by juries packed with non-Mormons, and sentenced to
imprisonment, some for long periods of time.40 In prison, the polyga-
mists were attacked by convicted murderers, thugs, and legions of
bedbugs. Latter Day Saints found they could avoid these horrors by
renouncing their religious practice, for judges were inclined to let
penitents off with fines. Yet Mormon resistance continued. The fed-
eral government responded with the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887,
41
which disenfranchised not only Mormon polygamists but also any
person advocating polygamy, declared the property of the Church of
the Latter Day Saints forfeit to the United States for the church's
crimes against marriage, made it easier to prove guilt in polygamy
cases, abolished elective offices in Utah and made officials subject to
37. The campaign against the Latter Day Saints is described in Van Wagoner, Mormon
Polygamy at 115-22 (cited in note 8); Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy
Cases, 9 Utah L. Rev. 308 (1964).
38. The Edmunds Act, 22 Stat. 30 (1882), codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1461, upheld in Murphy
v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (disenfranchisement); Clawson v. United States, 114 U.S. 477
(1885) (jury service); Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885) (criminal cohabitation). The
Act was repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-213, § 16(a),(b),(g)-(u), 97 Stat. 1462, 1463 (1983).
39. Quoted in Merlo J. Pusey, Builders of the Kingdom: George A. Smith, John Henry
Smith, George Albert Smith, 135 (Brigham Young U., 1981).
40. See generally Van Wagoner, Mormon Polygamy at 115-22 (cited in note 8) and Linford,
9 Utah L. Rev. at 308 (cited in note 37).
41. The Edmunds-Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 635 (1887), codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1480(a), upheld
in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 347-48 (1890) (membership in LDS Church can be the basis for
denying the right to vote); The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (confiscation of LDS property). The Act was repealed by Pub.
L. No. 95-584, § 1, 92 Stat. 2483 (1978).
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federal appointment, declared children of plural marriages illegiti-
mate and prohibited their inheriting from their parents, and abol-
ished female suffrage in Utah. The United States Supreme Court
upheld these various invasions of civil and religious liberties in two
decisions, The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ v.
United States (1890),42 and Davis v. Beason (1890).43
Late Corporation and Beason are harder to reconcile with the
free exercise of religion than Reynolds, because they not only severely
penalized a person for practicing his faith, but they sanctioned ex-
treme civil and criminal penalties against a religious community
itself. Those Supreme Court decisions lent constitutional sanction to
Kulturkampf, a state campaign to destroy religious nonconformity.
The campaign was successful in that the leadership of the LDS
Church abandoned polygamy as a religious principle soon after
Beason." The campaign was less successful in that it drove polygamy
underground; even today, there are sects of fundamentalist Mormons
who preach and practice polygamy as a religious principle. 45
Except among Mormon fundamentalists, much of the above
was largely forgotten history until Justice Scalia reminded us of this
Kulturkampf in Romer. Justice Scalia maintained that some of the
Beason decision remains substantially good law, a point that the
Court barely quibbled with.46 In light of the context of the decision,
Justice Scalia understated the Court's repudiation of the Beason
precedent. As he conceded, the Court's free speech jurisprudence is
inconsistent with Beason's holding that the state can criminally pun-
ish mere advocacy of polygamy. There are other dimensions of
Beason's invalidity, however. The cases recognizing a fundamental
right to vote would probably require a different result than Beason's
willingness to deny Mormons the right to vote because of their
status.47  The constitutional right to privacy is inconsistent with
Beason's willingness to criminalize consensual cohabitation,48 the
42. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
43. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
44. See Van Wagoner, Mormon Polygamy at 133-42 (cited in note 8).
45. See id. at 177-218.
46. Compare Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635-36 and n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
criminalization of polygamy and the denial of convicted polygamists the right to vote remains
good law under Beason), with id. at 1628 (opinion of the Court).
47. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (recognizing "a constitutionally
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens").
48. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (citing
privacy cases for the proposition that state housing regulation may not intrude on the private
realm of the family). Five justices voted to invalidate a regulation making it a civil violation for
unmarried people to live together, four justices on privacy grounds and one justice (Stevens) on
[Vol. 50:419
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crime for which most Mormon polygamists were convicted. Modern
free exercise clause jurisprudence is strongly inconsistent with the
Court's willingness in Beason (and Late Corporation) to allow the
state to destroy a religious practice that popular majorities consider
immoral.49 Even the minimal rationality requirement of due process
and equal protection is at odds with a precedent upholding serious
criminal penalties for belief and consensual practices. There is
scarcely a fundamental right in the modern constitutional lexicon that
does not undermine the precedential force of Beason, a precedent
generally at war with the Framers' original understanding that courts
would stand in the way of majority hysteria against minorities.
B. Bowers and Antihomosexual Kulturkampf
The generation after World War II witnessed a state-led
Kulturkampf against homosexuals in the United States. The anti-
homosexual terror in the United States from 1947 to 1961 was a
chilling echo not only of the anti-Mormon crusade between 1882 and
1887, but also of the antihomosexual terror in Nazi Germany from
1933 to 1945.50 Although originally adopted for moralist reasons and
long applied primarily to nonconsensual sex by males against
animals, minors, and women, sodomy laws became the focal
regulatory mechanism for persecuting homosexuals and their
subcultures.
takings grounds. Id. at 496-97, 499, 521. Moore very probably would have garnered at least five
votes for a criminal penalty: although Justice Stevens's property-protecting rationale would
have been inapplicable, it is very likely that he, and possibly that one or more of the dissenting
justices, would have joined the plurality's privacy-based invalidation.
49. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-36 (1972) (allowing Amish parents to control
their children's education); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993), which stand for the proposition that the state cannot seek to dictate a religious life.
Beason stands for the proposition that polygamy can be the basis for denying a civil right and,
read with Reynolds, imprisonment. Beason, 133 U.S. at 341-42, 347 (denying the right to vote);
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146, 150, 168 (affirming conviction for polygamy and sentence of two years
at hard labor). One can be critical of polygamy as an institution, while still being open to
tolerance of polygamy as a religious practice that seems to have been productive for many
people. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 160-62 (Penguin, 1978), for precisely this position.
50. The legal features of the Nazi antihomosexual terror are documented in Gilnter Grau,
ed., Hidden Holocaust? Gay and Lesbian Persecution in Germany 1933-45 (Cassell, Patrick
Camiller, trans., 1995), and Richard Plant, The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War Against
Homosexuals (Henry Holt & Co., 1986). The legal features of the American antihomosexual
terror are documented in William N. Eskridge, The Jurisprudence of Privacy and the Apartheid
of the Closet, 1947-1961, 26 Fla. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997), and Eskridge, Gaylaw at ch. 2
(cited in note 1).
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The homosexual in 1961 was smothered by law.51 He or she
risked arrest and possible police brutalization for dancing with some-
one of the same sex, cross-dressing, propositioning another adult
homosexual, possessing a homophile publication, writing about homo-
sexuality without disapproval, displaying pictures of two people of the
same sex in intimate positions, operating a lesbian or gay bar, or ac-
tually having sex with another adult homosexual. The last, consen-
sual homosexual sodomy, was a serious crime in all the states, and a
felony in all but one; several states imposed life sentences. A felony
conviction (and in some states merely a felony charge) subjected the
homosexual to special psychiatric evaluation as a potential "sexual
psychopath." If found to be such a creature, the homosexual was in-
carcerated indefinitely in a mental institution-for many inmates a
horror chamber of electroshock and mental torture and for some a life
sentence. In several states the convicted sodomite or solicitor would
have to register as a sex offender. If the homosexual were not a citi-
zen, she or he would likely be deported. If the homosexual were a
professional-a teacher, lawyer, doctor, mortician, beautician-she or
he would likely lose the certification needed to practice that profes-
sion. Even if the homosexual was not convicted of sodomy, arrest for
loitering, solicitation, or attempt to commit sodomy meant more than
a fine and an overnight stay in jail. Misdemeanor arrests for such
offenses meant that the homosexual might have her or his name pub-
lished in the local newspaper, and would probably lose his or her job.
If the charged homosexual were a member of the armed forces, she or
he might be court-martialed, and would likely be dishonorably dis-
charged and thereby lose all veterans' benefits, however distinguished
the individual's service record.
As it had largely acquiesced in the anti-Mormon Kulturkampf
in Beason and Late Corporation, the Supreme Court largely acqui-
esced in the antihomosexual Kulturkampf. The Warren Court's deci-
sion in Boutilier v. INS 52 upheld the immigration exclusion of homo-
sexuals and even bisexuals as people afflicted with "psychopathic per-
sonality.'" 53  The Burger Court's decision in Bowers54 rhetorically
segregated "homosexual sodomy" from "heterosexual sodomy" as a
proper object of state regulation.15 Boutilier, a statutory case, was
51. Examples and documentation for the descriptions in this paragraph can be found in
Eskridge, Gaylaw at ch. 2 (cited in note 1).
52. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
53. Id. at 122-23.
54. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
55. Id. at 190.
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overridden by Congress in 1990,56 and Bowers, a constitutional case,
should be overruled by the Court. Its reasoning and result have been
criticized from every point of view known to law professors, including
and particularly rule-of-law perspectives.
57
Damned by every knowledgeable commentator, Bowers has
been treated cautiously and sometimes disrespectfully. Immediately
after Bowers was delivered, the Missouri Supreme Court, in State v.
Walsh, upheld the application of its consensual homosexual sodomy
law to public fondling and solicitation of oral sex.58 Justice Donnelly,
who authored the decision, felt constrained to reject the federal con-
stitutional claims on the basis of Bowers but responded to the dissent-
ing justices with a separate statement opining that privacy claims
under the state constitution were preserved for future claimants.59
As Justice Donnelly suggested, challenges to sodomy laws have
shifted from the U.S. Constitution to state constitutions, and met
with some success. In Commonwealth v. Wasson,60 a divided
Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated a law criminalizing consensual
"deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex," as
inconsistent with the Kentucky Constitution's right to privacy.
61
Finding Bowers's originalism "misdirected" and its assumptions igno-
rant, the Kentucky court applied to gay people the principle that "[iut
is not within the competency of government to invade the privacy of a
citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone
56. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067.
57. See Eskridge, Gaylaw ch. 4 (cited in note 1) (inconsistent with history and political
theory); Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand Account
81-84 (Simon & Schuster, 1991) (inconsistent with precedent); Richard A. Posner, Sex and
Reason 341-50 (Harvard U., 1992) (ignorant); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet
(U. of California, 1990) (manipulative); Anne B. Goldstein, Comment: History, Homosexuality,
and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 Yale L.
J. 1073, 1102-03 (1988) (inaccurate); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and
Identity in and after Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1721 (1993) (slippery); Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L. J. 1493, 1496 (1987) (authoritarian); Thomas B.
Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 648
(1987) (homophobic); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431,
1461 (1992) (upholding "state-legitimized violence"). According to eminent conservative
constitutionalist Earl M. Maltz's learned opinion, commentators have overwhelmingly opposed
the result and reasoning of Bowers. Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative
Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 629, 645 n.95 (1990) (examining more
than thirty leading articles).
58. 713 S.W.2d 508, 509, 513 (Mo. 1986).
59. Id. at 514-15.
60. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
61. Id. at488, 491.
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is concerned, or to prohibit him any liberty the exercise of which will
not directly injure society."62
Two intermediate appellate court decisions from other states
were to similar effect. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Campbell
v. Sundquist, followed Wasson to issue a declaratory judgment that its
consensual same-sex sodomy law is unconstitutional. 63 The Tennessee
Supreme Court denied review in the case, leaving the state's
consensual homosexual sodomy law apparently void. In contrast,
after the Texas Court of Appeals granted a similar declaratory
judgment under the state constitution's right to privacy, in State v.
Morales6 4 the Texas Supreme Court vacated the judgment on the
ground that there was no justiciable case or controversy. 65 Similarly,
a Michigan trial judge held, in an unpublished opinion that was not
appealed by the state attorney general, that Michigan's sodomy laws
cannot constitutionally be applied to consensual same-sex intimacy.66
It is fair to say that no reported state court decision since
Bowers has applied a state sodomy law to private consensual intimacy
between two adults of the same sex (the Bowers facts).67 The Supreme
Court has also been skittish about its decision. Justice Powell, the
fifth vote for the majority opinion, publicly confessed in 1989 that it
was the vote he most regretted.68 Justice O'Connor, another member
of the five-Justice Bowers majority, co-authored the joint opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,69 which rejected Bowers's originalist
methodology for figuring the contours of the .liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause. "Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific
62. Id. at 494-95 (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 117 S.W. 383, 385 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1909)) (emphasis omitted).
63. 926 S.W.2d 250, 265-66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 9, 1996).
64. 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 869 S.W.2d 941
(Tex. 1994).
65. Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 949.
66. Michigan Org. for Human Rights v. Kelly, No. 88-815820 (CZ) (Wayne County Cir. Ct.,
July 9, 1990). Michigan's appellate courts have left the issue open. Compare People v. Lino, 196
Mich. App. 672, 496 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. App. 1992) (finding that the statute criminalizing
consensual same-sex intimacy was not unconstitutionally vague).
67. State sodomy laws have been applied to public sex, see State v. Baxley, 656 So.2d 973
(La. 1995); People v. Lynch, 179 Mich. App. 63, 445 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. App. 1989); Walsh, 713
S.W.2d at 508. But see Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 487. State sodomy laws have also been applied
to commercial sex, see State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987); and oddly, sex between
different-sex couples outside of marriage, see Fry v. Patseavouras, 1992 U.S. Ct. App. LEXIS
21048 (4th Cir. 1992); State v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707 (R.I. 1995). But see Schochet v. State, 580
A.2d 176 (Md. Ct. App. 1990). The federal sodomy law applicable to members of the armed
forces is sometimes applied to private same-sex intimacy. See, for example, United States v.
Baum, 30 M.J. 626 (Mil. Rev. 1990).
68. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 530 (Macmillan, 1994).
69. 505 U.S. at 833 (1992).
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practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects," 70 she wrote,
pointedly ignoring Bowers (her co-authors were Justices Kennedy and
Souter who were not on the Court for Bowers). If due process protects
bodily integrity and personal autonomy, as Casey suggests, the right
to engage in consensual intimacy would seem a logical corollary.
International experience supports the proposition that laws
criminalizing same-sex intimacy are anachronistic for modern urban-
ized societies and inconsistent with a citizen's right of privacy in those
polities recognizing such a right. Virtually all the countries with laws
against consensual sodomy are nonindustrialized societies-Japan,
Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, Columbia, Venezuela, and most of the states in Europe
have no consensual sodomy laws. 7 1 The few straggler countries (such
as Ireland and Cyprus) or provinces (such as Tasmania [Australia]
and Northern Ireland [United Kingdom]) have been subjected to legal
as well as political pressure to abandon laws that are anachronistic
for modern urbanized societies that have sizeable gay populations.
72
Most member states of the European Community ("EC") have
repealed their sodomy laws, and the few that have not have been
found in violation of the privacy guarantees of the European
Convention on Human Rights.73
70. Id. at 838. Justice Scalia's position that the Due Process Clause protects only those
practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against state interference in
1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified), failed to command a majority of the Court
in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Justice O'Connor, later an author of the joint
opinion in Casey, concurred in the opinion in Michael H., specifically rejecting Scalia's vision of
the Due Process Clause. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. James Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 Hastings
Int'l. & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 64-66 (1994). See Rob Tielman and Hans Hammelburg, World Survey
on the Social and Legal Position of Gays and Lesbians, in Aart Hendriks, Rob Tielman, and
Evert van der Veen, eds., The Third Pink Book. A Global View of Lesbian and Gay Liberation
and Oppression 249-342 (Prometheus Books, 1993) (reviewing sodomy laws country-by-country
as of 1993).
72. Tielman and Hammelburg, World Survey, in Hendriks, Tielman, and van der Veen,
eds., Third Pink Book at 249-342 (cited in note 71).
73. In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 149 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., 1981),
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Northern Ireland's consensual sodomy prohi-
bition contravened the right to privacy set forth in Article 8 of the European Convention. Id. at
168. The decision affected only Northern Ireland; the remainder of the United Kingdom had
already decriminalized same-sex intimacy. The Court in Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Hum. Rts.
Rep. 186 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 1991), applied Dudgeon to require an entire country, Ireland,
either to decriminalize homosexuality or stand in violation of the Convention. Id. at 200-01. In
1993, the Court held that Cyprus's antisodomy law was likewise in derogation of the
Convention, thereby completing a clean sweep of such regulations in the EC. Modinos v.
Cyprus, 16 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 485, 493-94 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 1993).
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After Bowers, only one state in Australia-Tasmania--continued
to proscribe private, consensual sex between adult men. In 1992, the
Human Rights Commissioner in Australia asked the federal government
to override Tasmania's law. The Commissioner found that the
Tasmanian law breached Australia's obligation under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") to
ensure its citizens' privacy and equality rights. Upon petition of the
Tasmanian Gay & Lesbian Rights Group, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee agreed to review Tasmania's law for consistency
with the ICCPR. In Toonen v. Australia,74 the Committee held that
Tasmania's policy violated article 17(1) of the ICCPR,75 which protects
against "arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation."76 Toonen is of special significance, because the United
States, like Australia, has signed and ratified the ICCPR. 77 Having
ratified the ICCPR, the United States has accepted international
obligations under the covenant, although it has not agreed to
amenability to international adjudication of grievances before the
U.N. Human Rights Committee, nor is the treaty self-executing in
American courts.
Even when a treaty is not self-executing, U.S. courts will often
interpret federal law as consistent with America's international
commitments or with customary international law. v8 It is doubtful
whether the ICCPR, as interpreted in Toonen, would alone justify the
Supreme Court's overruling Bowers,79 but the ICCPR and the other
74. Report of the Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40 at 230, U.N. Doc. A/49140 (1994).
75. Id. at 235.
76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
172.
78. See for example, Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (avoiding
application of an act forbidding trade with France by American citizens by holding that an
American-born sea captain who had taken oath of allegiance to Denmark was a Danish citizen);
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 114 (1987) (stating that a United States statute
is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or an international agreement of
the United States where possible). In particular, non-self-executing treaties "may sometimes be
held to be federal policy superseding State law or policy." Id. § 115, comment (e). See Toll v.
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1982) (invalidating, under the Supremacy Clause, a Maryland law
denying non-immigrant aliens holding G-4 visas domiciled in Maryland "in-state" tuition
status).
79. For arguments that it does, see James D. Wilets, Using International Law to Vindicate
the Civil Rights of Gays and Lesbians in United States Courts, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 33,




international authorities are relevant to any reevaluation of Bowers
by state as well as federal courts. Reasoned judgments such as
Toonen and the EC decisions are subsequent developments that sup-
port a reconsideration of precedent and, more pointedly, that high-
light the anachronistic quality of Bowers's rule and its reasoning.
C. A Constitutional Presumption Against Kulturkampf
Beason is clearly an invalid precedent, and Bowers probably so.
That these were the only cases Justice Scalia deployed to flail the
Court for departing from precedent strengthens Justice Kennedy's
claim that Amendment 2 was exceptional in a polity reflecting rule of
law values. Moreover, the problems with Beason and Bowers are not
limited to their inconsistency with the Supreme Court's free exercise
and privacy jurisprudence. Our experience with such cases suggests
an important role for an independent judiciary as a buffer against
state-sponsored Kulturkampf.80
In a pluralist political system, some groups will not only dis-
like one another, but will be committed to the erasure of others. If a
group bent on destroying another group is large or powerful enough, it
might be able to deploy the political system to spearhead the effort.
This, historically, is what Kulturkampf is-the state's effort to erase a
normative subculture of its citizens. When the state seeks to confis-
cate an entire religion, as it did to the LDS Church, it presumptively
violates the Free Exercise Clause, but the anti-Kulturkampf idea
should not be limited to such cases.
What was wrong with the anti-Mormon Kulturkampf of the
1880s? The campaign against polygamy between 1882 and 1890 was
largely successful: people changed their religious practices; outward
conformity in one generation gave rise to inward conformity in the
next. Religious polygamy substantially disappeared from the United
States. 8' Yet the experience leaves a moral stench. It invoked the
power of the state in a cruel way-and without any good justification.
80. Like the original right of privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86
(1965); the right of judicial review, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803);
and the idea of sovereign immunity, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890); the presump-
tion against Kulturkampf discussed in this part is derived from the structure and underlying
principles of the Constitution. See also Professors Farber and Sherry, who derive their "pariah
principle" (a sibling to my rule against Kulturkampf) from unstated assumptions of our consti-
tutionalism. Farber and Sherry, 13 Const. Commentary at 269-70 (cited in note 12) (noting the
broad principle expressed by the Supreme Court that "government cannot brand any group as
unworthy to participate in civil society").
81. See Van Wagoner, Mormon Polygamy 177-218 (cited in note 8).
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There is little evidence that anyone was hurt by the plural marriages
practiced by the Mormons.
8 2
Kulturkampf is just as politically pernicious as it is morally
questionable. By demonizing otherwise productive citizens for con-
sensual conduct that is deeply meaningful to them, Kulturkampf not
only impedes individual human flourishing, but removes functional
people from contributing to overall social flourishing. Worse,
Kulturkampf is socially divisive. By empowering one group that
wishes to impose its morals on another, it risks empowering the most
vicious people in that group, creates anger and bitterness among the
persecuted, and invites other groups to deploy the state to achieve
their conformist goals. Worst, Kulturkampf is at war with the goal of
cultural diversity. Formal conformity risks social, intellectual, and
political ossification.
The foregoing political evils are among those that the Framers
believed could be regulated by judicial review. Recall Madison's con-
cern with laws that "divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to
vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common
good,"8 3 as well as Hamilton's concern that the legislature would enact
"unjust and partial laws."84 Madison's and Hamilton's concerns were
not with state campaigns to preserve public order against persons
who invaded the property or liberty of others, but can best be under-
stood to be with state campaigns to enforce moral conformity, pre-
cisely the sort of campaigns that have been termed Kulturkampf.8 5
Beason directly sanctioned anti-Mormon Kulturkampf at its
apex, and Bowers did the same thing for antihomosexual
Kulturkampf, albeit long after it had peaked in the 1950s. Colorado's
Amendment 2 was not nearly so severe as the other two measures,
and came long after the heyday of antihomosexual Kulturkampf. Yet
82. My own view is that in the context of western culture, polygamy is not a good deal for
women, but many women involved in plural marriages believe otherwise. (Recall, too, that
nineteenth-century marriage generally was not a great deal for women.)
83. Federalist No. 10 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 79 (cited in note
18).
84. Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 470 (cited in
note 23).
85. Neither historians nor I consider anti-drug campaigns Kulturkampf the way anti-
religious and antigay campaigns of persecution have been-even though campaigns are usually
aimed at "conduct" (polygamy, sodomy) rather than "status" (being a Mormon, a homosexual). I
would, on the other hand, consider it Kulturkampf if the state sought to erase a nomic
community whose ideas I consider pernicious, like the 19M I am not certain what conduct or




only the mild measure adopted in Colorado was felled by the Court.
This contrast suggests a depressing anomaly: the Supreme Court will
often lack the courage to stand up to Kulturkampf at its political
apex, when the persecuted group is most vulnerable, but will
retroactively condemn it when such condemnation is politically safer
(that is, the forces of Kulturkampf have faded and the persecuted
group has become a respectable socio-political force).86  This
descriptive point requires us to ask what normative role Romer really
plays, for Justice Scalia was just as wrong to call Amendment 2 a
"Kulturkampf' as he was to praise Beason and Bowers as exemplars
of the rule of law. What actually is the relationship of Romer to
Kulturkampf? Of Kulturkampf to democracy? These quandaries can
be better understood by reference to the role of the closet in the politi-
cal economy of the homosexual.
III. DEMOCRACY, KULTURKAMPF, AND THE CLOSET
For lesbians, gay men, and other sexual minorities, the closet
is the link between Kulturkampf and democracy. Specifically, the
antihomosexual Kulturkampf of the 1950s was a phenomenon
whereby democracy undermined its own functioning by pressing its
gay citizens into a political as well as a personal closet. When the
state declares war on a community whose members are characterized
by their ideas, feelings, and associations, members of the persecuted
minority have several options: they can capitulate and embrace the
state orthodoxy, they can flee the polity either by going underground
or traveling to another society, or they can "pass," pretending to follow
state orthodoxy but secretly perpetuating their heresy. The last
strategy has been characteristic of lesbian's, gay men, and bisexuals in
twentieth century America.87
The state actively hunted homosexuals like dogs in the 1950s.
Homosexuals were more adaptive than dogs, however, and responded
to the McCarthy-era terror by closeting their sexual identity.
American society soon enough lost interest in waging a costly cam-
86. This is a lesson from the theory developed in William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P.
Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 54 (1994).
87. Leading explications include Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (cited in note 57);
Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 932-63 (1989); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The
Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1753, 1794-1802 (1996)
(discussing the symbol of the closet). This is a theme I explore in my forthcoming book,
Eskridge, Gaylaw (cited in note 1).
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paign to track down homosexuals. Hunter and hunted worked out
this accommodation: the mutually protective closet-whereby the
state would stop rooting out homosexuals if they denied their sexual
identities, at least in public.88 The straight-threatening closet of the
1950s saw homosexuals as an aggressive criminal class and sought to
exterminate them. The mutually protective closet sought to reconsti-
tute homosexuals as a disfavored caste. The evolving federal justifi-
cation for excluding gay men and lesbians from the civil service re-
flects a shift from the straight-threatening closet of the 1950s to the
mutually protective one of the 1960s.
A Senate subcommittee report on "Employment of
Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government" was issued on
December 15, 1950.89 The report made the case against "homosexuals
and other sex perverts" in the government. According to the
subcommittee, "[t]he social stigma attached to sex perversion is so
great that many perverts go to great lengths to conceal their per-
verted tendencies," making them easy prey for "gangs of blackmail-
ers."90 Also, "those who engage in overt acts of perversion lack the
emotional stability of normal persons," and "indulgence in acts of sex
perversion weakens the moral fiber of an individual to a degree that
he is not suitable for a position of responsibility."91 Finally, the report
stated, "perverts will frequently attempt to entice normal individuals
to engage in perverted practices. This is particularly true in the case
of young and impressionable people who might come under the
influence of a pervert."92  Based upon these findings, the
subcommittee urged aggressive tactics to search for and exclude all
"homosexuals and other sex perverts" serving in the federal
government, a recommendation carried out by the Truman and
Eisenhower Administrations.
Federal employment exclusions of homosexuals were justified
differently in the 1960s. The Civil Service Commission explained its
exclusionary policy in a February 1966 letter. Civil Service Chair
John Macy claimed that the Commission did not exclude
"homosexuals" per se, only people who engaged in "overt" homosexual
"conduct" that became public through an arrest or general knowl-
88. The mutually protective closet and its instability are explored in Eskridge, 26 Fla. St.
L. Rev. (cited in note 50).
89. Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government, S. Doc. No. 241,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).





edge.93 So long as the homosexual did not "publicly proclaim that he
engages in homosexual conduct" or "prefers such relationships," Macy
suggested he could serve and the Commission would not pry. But
once the word was out, the Commission would consider the
"revulsion" of coworkers and "offense to members of the public." What
Macy was offering was the mutually protective closet, whereby the
homosexual could serve so long as she or he was not openly gay.94
This was an advance from the 1950 subcommittee report, but only an
advance from viewing homosexuals as a dangerous criminal class to
viewing homosexuals as a socially despised undercaste.
The purpose and effect of the mutually protective closet was to
deny gay people any presence or influence in American public life.
Individual lesbians or gay men could come out to coworkers only if
they were discreet and the coworkers were not offended,95 and they
certainly could not engage in public activism without fear of stirring
heterosexual resentment.96 The purpose was to protect heterosexuals
from being upset by a gay public presence, but the political effect was
deeper. The state or federal employee living in fear of telling even
close friends about her or his sexual orientation was in no position to
refute inaccurate stereotypes commonly held concerning homo-
sexuality, to engage in political activism seeking to change homopho-
bic policies, or to form lasting political organizations that could effec-
tively participate and bargain in the legislative and administrative
processes by which law is made and remade. Consider this last
point-the ability to organize politically-in more detail.
Interests in our pluralist polity must be organized in order to
have influence, but in getting organized all political interests face the
"free-rider problem." 97 Because political influence is a "public good"
the benefits of which will be shared by some who do not contribute to
93. Letter from J.W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission, to The
Mattachine Society of Washington, D.C. (Feb. 25, 1966) (on file with the FBI, FOIA File HQ 100-
403320 [Mattachine Society] § 7). This letter is reproduced at Appendix A to William N.
Eskridge, Out of the Closets, Establishing Conditions for Gay Intimacy, Norms, and Citizenship,
1961-1981, _ Hofstra L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 1997).
94. On the eve of Stonewall, Chief Judge Bazelon rejected the Commission's compromise
in Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
95. See Rowland v. Mad River School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 730 F.2d 444, 446
(6th Cir. 1984).
96. See Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 248-51 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 491 F.2d 498,
499-500 (4th Cir. 1974).
97. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of




its creation, members of a group of similarly interested persons will
rationally choose to free ride on the efforts of others, thereby weaken-
ing the influence of the group as a whole. The free-rider problem
applies with triple force to groups suffering under outlaw or under-
class status. Under a regime of the closet, people with the same in-
terests (1) will have difficulty even identifying each other and (2) will
have much stronger incentives to avoid open political activity of any
sort, thereby (3) exacerbating the free-rider tendency of organized
groups not to form or to enjoy limited resources.
Gay people started to gain political influence only after modest
numbers came out-or were pushed out-of the closet in the 1960s.
Once gays were seen and heard in the political process, most of the
state exclusions melted away, as did many of the laws criminalizing
homosexual solicitation and sex between consenting adults. Today, it
is unlikely that a lesbian or a gay man who engages in private
consensual intimacy will be subject to criminal prosecution.
Nonetheless, a large majority of gay people remain substantially in
the closet, in large part because they fear losing their jobs in the
private sector. Evidence supports the fact that many, and perhaps a
majority, of openly gay employees face workplace discrimination.98
Unlike race and sex, sexual orientation is rarely apparent upon casual
observation, unless the person self-identifies. Hence, all lesbian, gay,
and bisexual workers have a strong incentive to remain closeted-and
most do so in order to avoid discrimination and harassment. Just as
African Americans and other ethnic minorities gained political
representation only after apartheid cracked open and they could
mobilize openly in the political arena, so gays and lesbians can be
effectively represented only after the apartheid of the closet cracks
completely.
The tyranny of the closet is a solid political theory reason to
justify laws prohibiting private as well as public employment dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. Without such laws, many
gay people will be afraid to participate openly on the only issues that
matter to them. Such laws contribute to a transition from a regime of
the closet, in which the state materially participated, to a regime of
free speech and political participation. Nine states, the District of
Columbia, and dozens of municipalities have such employment non-
98. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48
Indus. & Labor Relations Rev. 726, 728 (1995); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994:




discrimination laws-including Aspen, Denver, and Boulder,
Colorado.
The effect, and surely also the purpose, of Colorado's
Amendment 2 was to reinforce a regime of the closet for gay people. 99
Amendment 2 was not only sending a message of disapproval to a
traditionally despised minority-itself potentially chilling or incendi-
ary or both-but was removing an important prerequisite for political
participation by many gay people (job protection). 1°°  Though
Amendment 2 was enacted by a democratic process, it would have had
the antidemocratic effect of impairing the ability of gays to mobilize
politically. This inverts Justice Scalia's accusation that the Court's
opinion in Romer is simply antidemocratic and provides a democracy-
enhancing justification for Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court.
Reading Justice Kennedy's opinion most ambitiously, Professor
Michael Seidman maintains that the state has an affirmative obliga-
tion to enact laws protecting lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from
discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommoda-
tions.101 The foregoing analysis provides some normative support for
Professor Seidman's ambitious reading of Romer. Because the state
in the 1950s aggressively contributed to the creation of a closeted
identity that crippled homophilic political mobilization, the state in
the 1990s has a remedial obligation to correct some of the damage
through nondiscrimination laws. Hence Amendment 2 is properly
invalid because it seeks to return state policy to one of antidemocratic
closetry.
The foregoing analysis provides a link to the Supreme Court's
decisions striking down race-based initiatives. In Reitman v.
Mulkey °2 and Hunter v. Erickson,°3 the Court invalidated initiatives
repealing laws adopted to remedy housing and public accommodation
discriminations against African Americans and imposing special,
more difficult, procedures for adopting new laws with the same effect.
99. Compare Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d
261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding Cincinnati's antigay initiative and refusing to consider
homosexuality a "suspect classification" because it is a feature of one's makeup easily hidden),
vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (1996).
100. I am not saying that "mosf' gay people would be willing to come out of the closet if
they were protected against job discrimination, and there is no basis for believing that many
would do so in the short term. The more important focus is the longer term. With employment
discrimination protections in place, new entrants into the employment marketplace would feel
freer to be openly gay or lesbian.
101. Seidman, 1996 S. Ct. Rev at 67 (cited in note 12).
102. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
103. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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Although the initiatives were most vulnerable because they deployed
suspect race-based classifications, they also can be criticized as anti-
democratic. The state shares responsibility for racial apartheid in
American history, and this responsibility bespeaks a moral and some-
times constitutional obligation to remedy its continuing effects. Any
premature rollback in enacted protections should be viewed with
suspicion, for the rollback would threaten the democratic value of
empowering minority political participation. Neither decision neces-
sarily stands for the proposition that the Court in the 1960s would
have invalidated any rollback, but the decisions certainly support the
idea that a democracy-enhancing Court should apply heightened
scrutiny to such measures.
Note that the Supreme Court never had to resolve the race
analogue closest to Colorado's Amendment 2. Practices such as the
poll tax and literacy requirements, which were key to Jim Crow ef-
forts to render African Americans politically as well as socially mar-
ginal, kept African Americans off the voting rolls. Assume that a
state with county literacy tests that reduced minority voter registra-
tion adopted a statute abolishing those tests, so that people of color
could equally participate in the political process. Assume, further,
that a popular referendum repealed that statute and directed that
future statutes of that sort could only be accomplished by amending
the state constitution. Under ordinary precepts of judicial review, the
move would be hard to fault: there is no suspect classification such as
race, and the Supreme Court has held, in a much-criticized decision,
that literacy tests are constitutionally permissible.104 The Court that
decided Reitman and Hunter, however, would probably invalidate
such a referendum and reinstate the prior statute.
Three principles support this result. One is that referenda
cannot repeal constitutionally mandated remedies; in deciding what
is constitutionally mandated the Court can consider the judgment of
the legislative body being overridden. Thus, if the state legislature
has determined that literacy tests perpetuate racial apartheid, the
Court should be emboldened to hold the abolition of such tests uncon-
stitutional, in this particular case even if not more generally. A sec-
ond principle is based on remedial justice: When the state itself has
contributed to an antidemocratic apartheid, the state has a special
responsibility to correct it, and efforts to repeal corrections will be
104. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). The analysis
in Lassiter is at some odds with Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668-69
(1966) (striking down poll taxes and overruling Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937)), but
Lassiter has never been overruled and might survive in today's Court even if reconsidered.
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strictly scrutinized to assure that they serve genuinely important
state interests. A third principle is procedural: When popular refer-
enda repeal measures that seek to redress democratic dysfunctions,
they should be scrutinized with more than the usual bite. This third
principle can be justified not only from John Hart Ely's representa-
tion-reinforcement theory, but also from Hans Linde's theory that
Article IV's assurance of a republican form of government empowers
judges to demand more than plausibility when initiatives target an
out-group such as gay people.105
These principles also justify the Romer Court's willingness to
strike down Amendment 2. The remedial justice principle is impli-
cated, because Amendment 2 was a retreat from local and state direc-
tives that sought to ameliorate the apartheid of the closet that fed-
eral, state, and local policies had long supported. While the state
might not be flatly prohibited from repealing such remedial policies,
repeal efforts should be subjected to means-ends scrutiny that has
real bite (unlike the toothless rational basis test as usually deployed).
When the repeal efforts are by popular referendum or initiative, the
third principle suggests that judicial scrutiny ought to be even more
demanding. If the legislature is sensibly remedying a defect in the
democratic process, that process cannot be trusted when it seeks to
preserve the dysfunction.
At bottom, Justice Scalia's Romer dissent does us all a service
by insisting that the Court and the nation consider the consequences
of the decision for the operation of American democracy. Like Judge
Linde and Professor Schacter, I believe the consequences are good.
They will be improved if the Court, perhaps slowly and over time,
discourages the political process from focusing on sexual orientation
as an obsessional classification.
105. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 13); Linde, 72 Or. L. Rev. at 19 (cited in
note 29).
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